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UNDEFINED EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT
EXCLUSIONS IN HEALTH INSURANCE
CONTRACTS: A PROPOSAL FOR
JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Abstract Health insurance contracts often exclude coverage for experimental treat-
ments. No accepted definition of experimental treatment exists, however, and insurance
contracts rarely define the term. Although experimental treatment exclusions are neces-
sary and desirable, insurers may easily manipulate undefined exclusions to exclude treat-
ments on inappropriate bases such as cost. Thus, courts should construe the term
"experimental" narrowly and find treatments non-experimental if there is any demon-
strated likelihood of their success.
When standard chemotherapy failed to destroy thirty-five year old
Pamela Pirozzi's breast cancer, her doctor recommended a recently
developed treatment.' Her insurer refused to pay for the treatment,
claiming it was experimental and thus excluded under her insurance
contract.2 Pirozzi sued the insurance company. Because her health
plan did not define "experimental," 3 the court had to interpret what
the term meant. Pirozzi, who was not expected to survive even a year
without the treatment, had to wait three weeks4 for the completion of
an expedited trial to gain coverage and begin treatment.' Dilemmas
such as Pirozzi's are inevitable when insurers exclude experimental
treatment but do not define the term.
Most health insurance contracts6 exclude experimental treatment.7
Health. insurers do this to avoid paying for unproven, fraudulent, or
worthless treatments and to maintain their ability to offer an afforda-
ble product.' Experimental treatment exclusions are useful in achiev-
ing these objectives because physicians sometimes recommend new
1. Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 588 (E.D. Va. 1990). The
recommended treatment was high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow transplant
(HDCr-ABMT).
2. Id.
3. Ia
4. Washington Post, Apr. 17, 1990, at B1, col. 1, B7, col. 2.
5. 741 F. Supp. at 587.
6. Insurance is a contract where one party, for consideration, promises payment upon the
happening of an uncertain event. I G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1.2 (2d ed.
1984). Some health service contracts technically are not insurance contracts because they do not
indemnify for medical expenses incurred by the subscriber, but arrange for provision of medical
services on a pre-paid basis. For purposes of this Comment, the term "insurance" includes both
indemnification contracts as well as arrangements where medical costs are covered on a pre-paid
basis.
7. Washington Post, supra note 4, at Bl, col. 1.
8. See Cline & Rosten, The Effect of Policy Language in the Containment of Health Care Cos
21 TORT INS. L.L 120, 121, 131-34 (1985).
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treatments before they become standard practice. 9 Physicians may
have a particularly strong incentive to prescribe new treatments when
patients are terminally ill or in similarly desperate situations. 0 Thus,
insureds' expectations that new treatments will be covered competes
with insurers' desire to avoid liability for unproven treatments."
When insurers do not define experimental treatment, they can apply
experimental treatment exclusions to inappropriately deny coverage.
Litigation may be insureds' only way to obtain coverage. Those with-
out energy, resources, or time to sue may be unfairly denied coverage
and vital health care. Occasionally, insureds may gain coverage
through either out-of-court settlements or insurer waivers. These tac-
tics, however, allow insurers to avoid changing their standard contract
exclusions. Courts reviewing coverage denials under experimental
treatment exclusions have an important role in regulating such
exclusions.
Courts should require insurers to enunciate in insurance contracts
the processes and criteria used to assess and characterize experimental
treatments. This will require that insurers consider only those factors
disclosed in the contract. It also will facilitate judicial review of
insurer decisions. In the absence of such criteria, courts should con-
strue experimental treatment exclusions narrowly and in favor of cov-
erage. Courts should consider any demonstrated likelihood of a
treatment's success as strong evidence that it is no longer experimen-
tal. A "demonstrated likelihood of success" standard would permit
courts to consider evidence such as unpublished study results, physi-
cian experience, and expert testimony. This standard is the most
appropriate approach to undefined experimental treatment exclusions
because it construes health insurance contracts in favor of insureds
while addressing the need for some proof of treatment efficacy.
Courts should review technology assessment criteria insurers include
in experimental treatment exclusions for clarity as well.
I. EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT EXCLUSIONS AND
COURTS
The role and characteristics of health insurance generally, the pur-
poses of the experimental treatment exclusion, and the ways insurers
typically administer the exclusion provide the backdrop for a discus-
9. See Banta, Burns & Behney, Policy Implications of the Diffusion and Control of Medical
Technology, 468 ANNALS 165, 170 (1983).
10. Id.
11. Cline & Rosten, supra note 8, at 123.
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sion of experimental treatment exclusions. In addition, courts con-
sider certain insurance and contract doctrines and public policies in
their role of regulating health insurance contracts. They take a variety
of approaches in reviewing insurer coverage denials under experimen-
tal treatment exclusions.
A. Health Insurance and Experimental Treatment Exclusions
Health insurance spreads costs and restricts utilization to-those
treatments that are safe and effective. Yet, health insurance is vulner-
able to manipulation by insurers, insureds and health care providers.
For instance, health insurers may control the types of treatments used
by limiting coverage to proven treatments through experimental treat-
ment exclusions. Most insurance contracts do not, however, define the
term "experimental." Instead, insurers may make technology assess-
ments to determine whether treatments are covered.12 A technology
assessment may consider a variety of factors, including cost.
1. Health Insurance
Health insurance serves two public functions. First, it spreads the
costs of health care.1 s Second, health insurance allocates financial
resources among different kinds of treatments. For instance, it
restricts worthless and untested treatments, 14 the use of which violates
public policy." Insurers serve as "gatekeepers," encouraging the use
of safe and effective treatments by paying for them and deterring
unsafe and ineffective treatments through non-coverage.
1 6
Despite its benefits, health insurance is vulnerable to manipulation
by insureds, insurers, and health care providers."7 Insureds may
overuse coverage, consuming more health care resources than are nec-
essary. 8 For example, insureds may expect or demand access to
12. " echnology assessment" broadly describes a variety of ways to assess the evidence of a
new technology's safety and effectiveness. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
13. Riesenfeld, Health Insurance, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIoETHics 637, 641 (W. Reich ed.
1978).
14. Monaco & Burke, Insurer as Gatekeeper. Handling Claims for Unproven Methods of
Medical Management, 18 FORUM 591, 591-96 (1983).
15. Cline & Rosten, supra note 8, at 131. For example, drugs not meeting Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) requirements generally are not permitted to be sold, even to terminally ill
patients believed to have no other possibilities for cure.- United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S.
544 (1979).
16. Monaco & Burke, Insurer as Gatekeeper- Part Two: Policy Obstacles in Unproven
Methods Litigation, 20 FORUM 400, 404 (1985).
17. Riesenfeld, supra note 13, at 641.
18. Id
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highly publicized, new or expensive technologies 9 On the other
hand, insurers may manipulate contracts by leaving gaps in coverage
that are not properly understood by insureds.20 The insurer may also
create contracts that are unclear as to which procedures are covered
and under what circumstances.2 Insureds therefore may have to ask
courts to determine their contract rights. Insurers also may manipu-
late contracts by considering inappropriate factors when assessing
whether coverage is available under the contract.22 Finally, the likeli-
hood of insurance reimbursement may encourage health care provid-
ers to use unnecessary, useless, fraudulent, or overpriced treatments.23
2. Experimental Treatment Exclusions
Most insurers exclude coverage for experimental treatments in their
health insurance contracts,24 primarily to limit their financial liabil-
ity.25 To cover expensive new treatments, insurers may have to charge
higher premiums or reduce other benefits.26 They use experimental
treatment exclusions to exclude treatments that are so new they can-
not be excluded by name." Strong physician and patient demand for
new treatments necessitates such exclusions.28 Treatments insurers
have considered experimental include in vitro fertilization,29 liver
19. Schaffarzick, Technology Assessment and Health Benefits Determination, 11 QUALITY
REV. BULL. 222, 222 (1985).
20. See Riesenfeld, supra note 13, at 641.
21. See Grumet, Health Care Rationing Through Inconvenience, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 607
(1989).
22. Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 846 F.2d. 416 (7th Cir.) (coverage denial predicated
on a treatment's success rate of less than 50% may be an unreasonable application of an
experimental treatment exclusion), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
23. Riesenfeld, supra note 13, at 641; see Daniels, Why Saying No to Patients in the United
States Is So Hard, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1382 (1986).
24. Washington Post, supra note 4, at Bl, col. 1. This Comment uses the phrase
"experimental treatment exclusion" to refer to all categorical exclusions of "experimental"
treatments, "investigative" treatments, and other similarly worded exclusions because neither
courts nor insurers typically differentiate among such terms. But see Dozsa v. Crum & Forster
Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131 (D. N.J. 1989) (the insurer abused its discretion in evaluating a
treatment with criteria used to assess whether a treatment was investigational when the contract
excluded experimental treatment).
25. See Cline & Rosten, supra note 8, at 121, 131-34.
26. Schaffarzick, supra note 19, at 224.
27. See Cline & Rosten, supra note 8, at 131-34 (concluding, however, that exclusions are
likely to be ineffective, especially when terminally ill patients are involved).
28. See Schaffarzick, supra note 19, at 222.
29. See, e.g., Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 856 (1988).
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transplants, 30 sex change operations, 31 gastric stapling,32 AIDS treat-
ment, 33 and various cancer therapies.34 Many of these treatments are
expensive.35
Insurers generally want to limit their liability solely to proven treat-
ments. 36 Physicians who are desperate to help their patients, however,
may seek to use treatments that look promising before they are proven
effective.37 They may feel ethically bound to offer whatever treatment
may benefit patients, regardless of cost,38 and in some instances,
regardless of the level of clinical studies completed.39
Despite the frequent use of experimental treatment exclusions, no
commonly accepted definition of "experimental treatment" exists."
Some scholarly defininitions of experimental treatment focus on
whether the treatment is intended solely to gather data or whether it is
intended to benefit a particular patient.4 ' Yet, insurers often do not
30. See, e.g., Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 857 F.2d 514 (9th Cir.
1988), cerL denied, 111 S. CL 581 (1990).
31. See, e.g., Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1980).
32. See. e.g., Exbom v. Central States Health & Welfare Fund, 900 F.2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1990).
33. Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 149 Misc. 2d 20, 562 N.Y.S. 2d 908 (Sup.
CL 1990) (HDCT-ABMT followed by intraveneous AZI).
34. See, e.g., Jones v. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1990)
(hyperthermia treatment); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-BIue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1990)
(HDCr-ABMT); Zuckerberg v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 119 Misc. 2d 834, 464 N.Y.S.2d 678
(Sup. Ct. 1983) (Gerson's therapy), rev'd on other grounds 108 A.D.2d 56, 487 N.Y.S.2d. 595
(1985), aff'd, 67 N.Y.2d 688, 490 N.E.2d 839, 499 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1986).
35. See, e.g., Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 846 F.2d 416, 421 (7th Cir.) (insurer
concerned about high cost of in vitro fertilization), cert. denied 488 U.S. 856 (1988); Rollo v.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, No. 90-597 (D. NJ. Mar. 22, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)
(HDCr-ABMT to cost $130,000 to $140,000); P'rozzi 741 F. Supp. at 588 (HDCT-ABMT to
cost $100,000); Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 132 (D. N.J. 1989) (HDCT-
ABMT to cost $75,000 to $125,000).
36. See Cline & Rosten, supra note 8, at 131-34.
37. Cowan, Innovative Therapy Versus Experimentation, 21 TORT & INs. L.J. 619, 629-32
(1986).
38. Relman, The Trouble with Rationing, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 911, 912 (1990).
39. Banta, Burns & Behney, supra note 9, at 170. Medical ethics limit physicians to providing
treatments likely to benefit their patients. Physicians who provide injurious non-standard
treatments may be subject to tort liability and negative peer review. Cowan, supra note 37, at
629-32.
40. Cowan, supra note 37, at 626.
41. Experimental procedures have been described as those "that are untested or unproved...
or are.., not related to the [patient's therapy] but rather performed solely for the purpose of
obtaining scientific data." Id. at 622. Experimentation has been defined as "an activity designed
to test a hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn and thereby to develop or contribute to
generalizable knowledge.. ." Id. Another definition is "any [study]... done with the intent of
developing new knowledge and which differs in any way from customary medical ... practice."
JraL
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define "experimental treatment" in insurance contracts.42 When
applying the term, some rely on a "technology assessment" to deter-
mine whether treatments are experimental. Technology assessment
broadly describes a variety of ways of assessing the evidence of a new
technology's safety and effectiveness.43 Some insurers consider factors
such as published studies, opinions of experts in the treatment area,'
and the procedure's cost.45 Some insurers use evaluative criteria. For
example, the Blue Cross/Blue Shield Association uses five criteria to
assess technology.' Procedures that fail to meet all five criteria are
considered experimental.47
B. Insurance Regulation: Judicial Role and Judicial Doctrine
Courts play an important role in regulating insurance contract
terms.4" Although most states regulate insurance contracts by stat-
ute,49 statutory regulation is ineffective in many instances.50 Thus, the
courts' role in reviewing insurer behavior can counterbalance insurers'
broad discretion in administering insurance contracts. Without the
possibility of such review, some contract provisions would be uncon-
scionable because of insurers' greater bargaining power.51
42. See Newcomer, Defining Experimental Therapy--A Third Party Payer's Dilemma, 323
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1702 (1990).
43. See Schaffarzick, supra note 19, at 222-24.
44. Id. at 223.
45. Ia at 224 (Blue Shield of California considered cost effectiveness in its technology
assessment).
46. See Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 590 (E.D. Va. 1990). The five
technology evaluation criteria are: (1) whether the FDA approved the drug or device for the
particular indication or application in question; (2) whether the peer-reviewed medical and
scientific literature contains sufficient information to enable the insurer to make conclusions
about the safety and efficacy of the drug, device, or procedure; (3) whether the available scientific
evidence demonstrates a net beneficial effect on health outcomes; (4) whether the drug, device, or
procedure is as safe and efficacious as existing alternatives; and (5) whether the drug, device, or
procedure reasonably can be expected to satisfy criteria 3 or 4 when applied outside the research
setting. Id. at 590-91.
47. Id. at 591. Blue Cross also uses the word "investigative." Id. at 588.
48. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW BASIC TEXT § 6.3(a) (1971).
49. K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 126 (1986).
50. See id.
51. See Zuckerberg v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 119 Misc. 2d 834, 464 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681
(Sup. Ct. 1983) (a contract provision that allowed the insurer to judge whether a treatment was
necessary, and thus covered, would offend public policy but for the existence of judicial review),
rev'd on other grounds, 108 A.D.2d 56, 487 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1985), aff'd, 67 N.Y.2d 688, 490
N.E.2d 839, 499 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1986). But see Zweig & Perry, Health Care Goes to Court,
Washington Post, July 17, 1990, at Z6 (Health) (judicial review may be ineffective because
testimony on which courts' decisions are based is self-serving and one-sided).
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Courts apply general insurance law and contract principles in exper-
imental treatment exclusion cases.52 First, they construe contract
ambiguities against insurers.53 This approach developed because
insurers typically have more control over contract provisions and
greater bargaining power than insureds.54 Second, to protect insureds
from contract ambiguities, courts require informed assent to contract
terms.55 In other words, contracts must disclose all relevant informa-
tion and insureds must be able to understand contract terms. Unam-
biguous disclosure of coverage limitations allows for genuine choices
and enhances both freedom of contract and personal autonomy.
56
Finally, courts construe coverage clauses broadly and exclusion
clauses narrowly. This comports with construing contract ambigui-
ties against the insurer58 and achieves the insurance goal of cost-
spreading.
59
Courts have responded to experimental treatment exclusions in a
variety of ways. Some courts conclude that such exclusions are ambig-
uous.' For example, in Zuckerberg v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, the
court found an exclusion ambiguous because it limited coverage to
treatments "generally recognized" to be effective.61 The court refused
to interpret "generally recognized" to mean recognition by the medi-
52. See I G. COUCH, supra note 6, § 1.4. Employees with medical insurance through their
employer also are protected under a separate statutory scheme, the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1467 (1988). The effects of ERISA on
experimental treatment exclusion cases are beyond the scope of this Comment.
53. 10A G. COUCH, supra note 6, § 41A:2. Note, however, that some health plans are
administered through trusts. Trust doctrine differs from contract doctrine in that ambiguities in
trust language are resolved in favor of the trustee if the trustee's interpretation is reasonable. See
Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 857 F.2d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990).
54. R. KEETON, supra note 48, § 6.3(a).
55. K. ABRAHAm, supra note 49, at 117.
56. Ia (informed assent is "the making of contractual decisions with a complete
understanding of the scope of the undertaking").
57. McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 440 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
58. Id.
59. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
60. See e.g., Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 857 F.2d 514, 516 (9th Cir.
1988) ("In the context of modem medicine, the term 'experimental' seems clearly ambiguous on
its face."), cert. denied, IlI S. Ct. 581 (1990). But see Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, No. 90-
597 (D. NJ. Mar. 22, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (the court found the exclusion
"reasonable," but granted coverage because the insurer failed to follow its own technology
assessment process).
61. 119 Misc. 2d 834, 464 N.Y.S.2d 678, 682-83 (Sup. Ct. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 108
A.D.2d 56, 487 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1985) (disagreeing with ,the trial court's holding of ambiguity in
dicta), aff'd, 67 N.Y.2d 688, 490 N.E.2d 839, 499 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1986) (declining to address the
ambiguity issue).
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cal-scientific community.62 The court also found a further provision
for payment if a treatment was recognized by an "appropriate" gov-
ernment agency ambiguous.63
Although some courts have established parameters for the term
"experimental treatment," none has attempted a simple definition.
For example, in Washington v. Winn Dixie, the court held that
hyperbaric oxygen treatment was experimental, even though no other
treatments for spinal cord injuries were available for the patient and
the treating physician had experienced success with the treatment.64
In Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Insurance Co., however, another court
held that a treatment that was the only "appropriate" one remaining
for a terminally ill insured after all other treatments had failed was not
experimental.65
In reviewing insurer denials under experimental treatment exclu-
sions, courts focus on certain factors. These include the treatment's
high cost,66 testimony from experts in the specialty area, 67 the
patient's condition and the 'lack of alternative treatments,68 the
approval and acceptance of the components of the treatment,69 the use
of research protocols, 70 consensus in professional medical literature
regarding the treatment's effectiveness, 7' how well known a treatment
62. Zuckerberg, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 682-83.
63. Id. at 682.
64. 736 F. Supp. 1418, 1422 (E.D. La. 1990).
65. 716 F. Supp. 131, 138 (D. N.J. 1989).
66. Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 857 F.2d 514, 517 (9th Cir. 1988)
(procedure's high cost considered indicative of its experimental nature), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
581 (1990).
67. Dozsa, 716 F. Supp. at 139 (in assessing whether a treatment is recognized in a doctor's
specialty, "[r]ationally, such doctors must be those who would work in the field" of the
treatment).
68. Id. at 138 (treatment was not experimental because the patient was terminally ill and the
treatment was the only available alternative).
69. Id. at 139 (treatment was not experimental because both the chemotherapy drugs and
bone marrow transplant that constitute the components of HDCT-ABMT are accepted medical
treatments).
70. Sweeney v. Gerber Prods. Co. Med. Benefits Plan, 728 F. Supp. 594, 596 (D. Neb. 1989)
(treatment was experimental because physicians using HDCT-ABMT or breast cancer treatment
were experimenting with different protocols). Research protocols sometimes are used to gather
data on different treatment regimens to further evaluate treatments. See 3 INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY (E. Becker & S. Landau eds. 1986).
71. Sweeney, 728 F. Supp. at 596.
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is and its duration of use,72 and lack of government approval.73 Other
courts have considered some of these factors not indicative that a
treatment is experimental. Factors courts have deemed not dispositive
or not relevant include the American Medical Association's (AMA's)
conclusion that the treatment is non-experimental, 74 lack of govern-
ment approval,75 coverage by other insurers and Medicare,76 lack of
support in the literature,77 lack of randomized clinical studies,7  a
death rate as high as fifteen percent,79 and a success ratio of less than
fifty percent.
80
C. Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield: A Case Study
Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield81 is a typical experimental exclu-
sion case. Pamela Pirozzi sought coverage for high-dose chemother-
apy with autologous bone marrow transplant (HDCT-ABMT), a
treatment that was her best chance for survival.82 Because the proce-
dure was expensive, the hospital required preauthorization from her
72. Zuckerberg v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 119 Misc. 2d 834, 464 N.Y.S.2d 678, 682 (Sup.
CL 1983) (because Gerson's therapy had been used for more than 30 years and was well known,
it was not experimental), rev'd, 108 A.D.2d 56, 487 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1985), aff'd, 67 N.Y.2d 688,
490 N.E.2d 839, 499 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1986).
73. Jacob v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 92 Or. App. 259, 758 P.2d 382, 383 (1988) (that
Gerson's therapy was not approved by "appropriate" government agencies established it as an
experimental treatment).
74. Jones v. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1990)
(despite testimony that, according to the AMA, hyperthermia treatment for breast cancer was
established medical practice, the insurer's deference to its own medical consultant's claim that
the treatment was experimental was not clearly erroneous).
75. Zuckerber, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 682 (although no government body had approved the
treatment, the court held it was not excluded under an experimental treatment exclusion).
76. Jones, 906 F.2d at 482 (upholding a trustee's determination that a procedure was
experimental despite testimony that Medicare and other insurers covered it).
77. Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 138 (D. NJ. 1989) (although lack of
peer-reviewed studies may indicate that a treatment is not recognized, it is not conclusive
evidence); Zuckerberg, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 683 (if the insurer wanted to exclude coverage because
the literature did not support the treatment's use, the contract should have indicated that lack of
such support was grounds for exclusion).
78. Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 593-94 (E.D. Va. 1990) (the lack of
such studies is persuasive but not dispositive in light of other evidence that the treatment is not
experimental).
79. Id. at 593 (a high death rate does not indicate that a treatment is experimental when the
treatment is likely to be successful and the patient has poor chance of surviving without the
treatment).
80. Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 846 F.2d. 416, 423 (7th Cir.) (using such a ratio to
define experimental could be arbitrary and capricious), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
81. 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1990).
82. Id. at 588. HDCT-ABMT is a procedure in which bone marrow is extracted from the
patient and stored while the patient receives large, near lethal doses of chemotherapy. The
patient's stored bone marrow is returned after the chemotherapy is complete. Id
817
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insurer." Although HDCT-ABMT is covered by most insurers when
used for cancers other than breast cancer,8 4 the insurer denied cover-
age on the grounds that the treatment was experimental and thus
excluded under Pirozzi's insurance contract.8 5 Like many health
insurance contracts, Pirozzi's contract did not define "experimental
treatment. 816 Pirozzi sued for a declaratory judgment that the con-
tract covered HDCT-ABMT for breast cancer.8 7
The insurer evaluated HDCT-ABMT using five technology evalua-
tion criteria 8 and found that the procedure failed to meet them.89
The court held that the criteria were not binding on the insured
because they were not in the contract, nor did the contract state that
they would apply.90 Furthermore, it considered some of the criteria
vague. 91
The court found the experimental treatment exclusion ambiguous
because "experimental treatment" was not defined.92 The court con-
strued the exclusion by examining each of its provisions. 93 In addition
to excluding experimental treatment, the exclusion denied coverage to
those treatments "of no scientifically proven value," and those "not in
accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice." 94
Considering the phrases together, the court reasoned that a procedure
found in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical
practice or of scientifically proven value was not experimental.95 The
court then considered expert testimony to determine whether the
treatment was experimental. 96
The court held that Pirozzi's experts presented convincing evidence
that the treatment had "scientifically proven value" and was "in
83. Id. The cost was expected to exceed $100,000.
84. Washington Post, supra note 4, at B7, col 3; N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1990, at 1, col. 6, B8,
col. 6.
85. Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 588. The contract excluded "[e]xperimental or clinical investi-
gative procedures; services of no scientifically proven medical value; [and] services not in
accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice." Id.
86. Id. at 589-90.
87. Id. at 587. As an employment benefit, the contract was governed by ERISA. See supra
note 16.
88. See supra note 46.
89. Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 591.
90. Id.
91. Id. The court found that the phrases "sufficient information," "a net beneficial effect on
health outcomes," and "safe and efficacious," were "question begging" and undefined. Id.
92. Id. at 589-90.
93. Id. at 590.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 591-94.
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accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice." '97
The court identified the following factors as persuasive. First,
Pirozzi's experts testified that the treatment was "far from... unu-
sual" and used at most major medical centers.98 Second, they testified
that HDCT-ABMT was the appropriate treatment for Pirozzi's condi-
tion after other treatments had failed.99 The court found the lack of
randomized clinical trials unpersuasive evidence that the treatment
was experimental."° Similarly, evidence that the treatment's mortal-
ity rate was as high as fifteen percent was not dispositive evidence that
it was experimental.' 01 The treatment's likelihood of success and the
near certainty that the patient would die without it outweighed the
risk of death. 0 2 The court granted the declaratory judgment, reason-
ing that it was not a "quack remed[y]" or "fringe therapy" but
"medicine's state of the art treatment for certain... patients."10 3
II. ANALYZING UNDEFINED EXPERIMENTAL
TREATMENT EXCLUSIONS
Courts face competing interests in cases involving experimental
treatment exclusions. On one hand, "subscriber premiums should not
have to pay for procedures which are purely experimental... or subsi-
dize every scientist stirring a magic potion in some laboratory at the
top of a mountain with lightening flashing about.""'4 Yet, typical
experimental treatment exclusions are undefined and easily manipu-
lated. "In the context of modem medicine, the term 'experimental'
seems clearly ambiguous on its face."' 0 5 Courts must protect insureds
from such ambiguity.
Courts play an important role in regulating insurance exclusions.
Current case law, however, fails to provide a clear statement of what is
required of insurers seeking to exclude coverage of experimental treat-
ment or what definition of "experimental" courts should use.10 6
97. IM. at 591.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 592.
100. Id at 593-94.
101. Id at 594.
102. Id at 593.
103. Id at 594.
104. Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, No. 90-597 (D. N.J. Mar. 22, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file).
105. Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 857 F.2d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, II1 S. Ct. 581 (1990).
106. Cline & Rosten, supra note 8, at 131 ("The only certainty in this area is that one cannot
predict the result in any individual case.").
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Courts should consider undefined experimental treatment exclusions
ambiguous. They should construe such exclusions narrowly, consider-
ing whether a treatment has demonstrated any likelihood of success as
indication that it is not experimental. They should not consider cer-
tain other factors indicative of non-experimental status, however, to
protect the public policy against unproven treatment. Finally, courts
should review any technology assessment criteria insurers include in
their experimental treatment exclusions for clarity.
A. The Problem with Undefined Experimental Treatment
Exclusions
Ambiguous experimental treatment exclusions are undesirable for
three reasons. First, insureds' informed assent to contracts is pre-
cluded by undefined exclusions. Second, insurers may easily manipu-
late undefined exclusions to exclude coverage on bases other than a
treatment's experimental status. Third, judicial review is hampered
when "experimental" is undefined.
1. An Undefined Exclusion Precludes Informed Assent
Health insurance contracts must fully inform insureds of the extent
of their coverage if insureds are to make rational purchases. Poorly
defined experimental treatment exclusions make such informed assent
unlikely. The informed assent doctrine requires conspicuous and plain
notice of non-coverage.1°' Thus, if insurers cannot name particular
excluded treatments with specificity, 10 8 contracts should explain how
denial decisions are made and what criteria are relevant to those deci-
sions. For example, in Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, to9 the insur-
ance contract excluded experimental treatment that Blue Cross did
not recognize as accepted medical practice.'I t The contract did not
disclose that the insurer required the treatment to have a success rate
greater than fifty percent to be accepted as standard."' The court
remanded for consideration of whether a fifty-percent success rate was
reasonable. 2 Regardless of whether such a requirement was reason-
able, the contract should have disclosed it." 3 Without notice of suc-
107. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
109. 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988).
110. Id. at 419.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 423-24.
113. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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cess-rate criteria or other factors insurers consider relevant to
treatments' status, consumers cannot make informed purchases.
2. Experimental Treatment Exclusions Are Easily Manipulated
When insurers use undefined exclusions, three opportunities for
insurer manipulation arise. First, undefined exclusions create uncer-
tainty about coverage because no agreement on what constitutes
experimental treatment exists. Thus, undefined exclusions may dis-
courage legitimate use of health care resources. For instance, uncer-
tainty about insurers' willingness to pay medical bills may influence
patients' or physicians' decisions about whether to seek treatment.I14
The possibility that insureds may have to go to court to enforce cover-
age may also deter them from seeking treatment. In cases where treat-
ment is sought but litigation is required, only those with the energy
and resources for a court battle will obtain coverage. 115 Thus, insur-
ance contracts with poorly defined experimental treatment exclusions
may preclude more than truly experimental treatment; they may pose
additional barriers to treatment through uncertainty and
inconvenience.
Second, given the expense of some new treatments, 116 insurers have
a financial interest in categorizing them as experimental. Undefined
experimental treatment exclusions allow insurers to rely on implicit
criteria, 117 such as cost, to screen out expensive procedures. By rely-
ing on cost as an undisclosed criteria in administering experimental
treatment exclusions, insurers can avoid paying for treatments that are
not truly experimental, but are just expensive.
Third, technology assessment also is easily manipulated. It is not a
precise science. Rather, it necessarily reflects personal bias and expert
opinion more than hard data."I Three problems arise when insurers
rely solely on published results of clinical studies in performing tech-
nology assessment. First, many new procedures are not rigorously
114. Cf Grumet, supra note 21, at 610.
115. Cf. Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, No. 90-597 (D. NJ. Mar. 22, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); Newcomer, supra note 42, at 1703 ("The persistent, litigious, or
persuasive patient is more likely to receive the possibly experimental treatment with [the current]
system."). Insurers may avoid eliminating this coverage obstacle by either settling lawsuits out
of court or waiving coverage denials when faced with a lawsuit. See Woman Wins Coverage for
Cancer Treatment United Press Int'l, July 24, 1990 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file).
Insurers would then have to pay only those willing to litigate, and not others with possibly
legitimate claims.
116. See supra note 35.
117. See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 846 F.2d 416, 421, 423 (7th Cir.), cerL denied,
488 U.S. 856 (1988); Newcomer, supra note 42, at 1703.
118. Schaffarzick, supra note 19, at 223.
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studied.1 9 Although the Food and Drug Administration analyzes
and approves new drugs, no equivalent government body systemati-
cally screens medical procedures- including new uses for approved
drugs-for their safety and efficacy. 120 New treatments are not always
rigorously studied by private researchers either. The most rigorous
studies may be difficult to perform on promising treatments if too few
patients are willing to risk being in the group receiving placebos.121
Second, even if rigorous clinical studies are conducted, a time lag
exists between the completion of an encouraging study and its publica-
tion in medical journals.122 Thus, the availability of evidence used in
assessing a treatment's status is delayed. 123 Finally, a consensus about
a treatment's efficacy is difficult to achieve even from the results of
rigorous studies.'
The inconsistent study of new technologies, particularly of new
combinations of accepted procedures, 125 may make it easy for insurers
to cite a lack of clinical studies when cost or other factors are the true
issue. 126 For instance, in Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins Co., the insured
sought coverage for HDCT-ABMT treatment for multiple
myeloma.127 The treatment was expected to cost between $75,000 and
$125,000.128 The insurer denied coverage, citing a lack of randomized
or controlled studies, 129 even though the company covered HDCT-
119. 3 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN
THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 232-33 (1983); see Faltermayer, Medical Care's Next
Revolution, FORTUNE, Oct. 10, 1988, at 126 (quoting Dr. Paul M. Ellwood, Jr., stating that
"[h]alf of what the medical profession does is of unverified effectiveness"). Randomized
controlled clinical trials (RCTs) are the most rigorous studies of the efficacy of medical
technology. Banta, Bums & Behney, supra note 9, at 177. They involve administering the new
treatment to one group and standard treatment to a control group and comparing their
effectiveness. Cowan, supra note 37, at 623-24. RCTs, however, are not always performed.
Schaffarzick, supra note 19, at 223.
120. Cowan, supra note 37, at 626.
121. Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 594 (E.D. Va. 1990).
122. Id. at 592.
123. Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 139 (D. N.J. 1989).
124. Newcomer, supra note 42, at 1703. Little consistency exists in the methods private
technology assessment organizations use. Schaffarzick, supra note 19, at 223. Thus, their
conclusions may be incongruous. Id.
125. For an example, see Dozsa, 716 F. Supp. at 139 (the components-ABMT and
chemotherapy-are accepted treatments; the dose and combination are new).
126. Wehr, National Health Policy Sought for Organ Transplant Surgery, 42 CONG. Q. 453,
454-56 (1984) (denial of coverage for liver transplants on the basis that the procedure was
experimental was a "convenient way of avoiding facing the enormous cost").
127. 716 F. Supp. at 132.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 136.
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ABMT for a variety of other cancers. 130 HDCT-ABMT had been suc-
cessful with those other cancers, thus, in characterizing HDCT-
ABMT as experimental for Dozsa's condition, the insurer's consultant
had stated that he was aware that he was "splitting hairs [because]
once one accepts ABMT as a technique for one indication it is a short
way to accepting it for [conditions such as Dozsa's].' 13 ' Randomized
clinical trials simply had not been completed and published on the use
of HDCT-AMBT with the insured's particular condition. Thus, the
insurer possibly masked a denial based on cost by claiming a lack of
published randomized studies.
3. Undefined Exclusions Encourage Courts To Rewrite Insurance
Contracts
Meaningful judicial review of experimental treatment exclusions is
hampered when technology assessment criteria are not included in the
contract. In such cases, courts will construe contracts in ways
designed to provide coverage'32 instead of determining whether insur-
ers' decisions were reasonable in light of the contract terms. This nar-
row construction may alter the coverage scheme developed by the
insurer and purchased by the insured.'33 It also may allow courts to
mandate coverage of treatments that have not been proven safe and
effective.
Such coverage mandates by courts may encourage overly cautious
insurer behavior. Although a particular coverage mandate may have
minimal effect on an insurer's financial situation, it may lead to uncer-
tainty about which treatments insurers may exclude under experimen-
tal treatment exclusions. Insurers may increase or reduce coverage in
anticipation of future judicial coverage expansions.'1 Alternatively,
they may respond to coverage mandates by offering more extensive
coverage than is desired by most insurance purchasers, driving premi-
ums higher.'35 For example, some insureds probably would prefer less
expensive health insurance over a costly plan that covers any treat-
ment sought, regardless of its safety or effectiveness.' 36
130. Id.
131. Id
132. Cf McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins., 565 F. Supp. 434, 440 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
133. Cf K. ABRAHAM, supra note 49, at 122-25 (for example, coverage mandates based on
insureds' reasonable expectations of coverage involuntarily increase the scope of coverage and
premium levels, thus impairing insureds' freedom of choice).
134. I at 123-25.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 125.
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When insurers use undefined experimental treatment exclusions,
courts may more readily mandate coverage of unproven treatments.
Courts may be reluctant to uphold coverage denials when orthodox
treatments have failed and the insured is desperately ill.137 Undefined
experimental treatment exclusions may allow courts to construe con-
tracts in favor of coverage regardless of whether a treatment has been
proven safe and effective.
When courts overturn reasonable coverage denials, they may inter-
fere with the provision of affordable insurance products and may act
contrary to the public policy against the use of unproven medical
treatments. Coverage limits provide for affordable insurance products,
and allowing insurers to exclude coverage of truly experimental treat-
ments is justifiable and desirable from the "gatekeeper" perspective.13
Insurers have a legitimate interest in screening the constant stream of
new technologies.' 39 They must do so in order to allocate financial
resources prudently."4 If expensive new treatments are ineffective,
their use drains funds unnecessarily from the insurance pool.14 1
B. A Proposed Judicial Response to Undefined Experimental
Treatment Exclusions and to Insurer Criteria
Courts reviewing coverage denials based on undefined experimental
treatment exclusions face two distinct tasks. First, they must evaluate
the exclusion language for ambiguity. Second, if the exclusion is
ambiguous, courts must construe the exclusion in favor of coverage
and against the insurer. 42 The analysis that follows recommends that
courts consider undefined experimental treatment exclusions ambigu-
ous and accept any demonstrated likelihood of success as evidence
that treatments are not experimental. Finally, it recommends an
approach for assessing any insurer criteria included in insurance
contracts.
137. See Cline & Rosten, supra note 8, at 134.
138. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
139. Cf Schaffarzick, supra note 19 (strong public demand for expensive new treatments
contributes to rising health care costs, making technology assessment and resource allocation
desirable).
140. See id.
141. Free v. Travelers Ins. Co., 551 F. Supp. 554, 560 (D. Md. 1982) (requiring "insurers to
pay for every remedy, proven or unproven, prescribed by a physician, could invalidate the
actuarial basis of current premium rates").
142. 10A G. COUCH, supra note 6, § 41A:2.
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1. Courts Should Consider Undefined Experimental Treatment
Exclusions Ambiguous and Construe Them Narrowly
Courts should consider experimental treatment exclusions ambigu-
ous if the contract does not state the criteria the insurer uses to assess
whether treatments are experimental. A coverage denial based on
undisclosed criteria is a denial based on terms that are not part of the
contract.'43 The Pirozzi court applied this reasoning. In Pirozzi, the
insurer used five criteria to assess new treatments. The court held
them non-binding because they were not described in the insurance
contract.144
In construing ambiguous experimental treatment exclusions, courts
should define "experimental treatment" narrowly. The important fac-
tor should be whether a treatment has demonstrated any likelihood of
success and safety. This standard recognizes that not all treatments
are rigorously tested, and that consensus is not always achieved after
testing.4 5 The likelihood-of-success standard allows consideration of
evidence from studies not yet published and testimony from providers
who have developed expertise with the treatment. At the same time,
this approach permits courts to uphold coverage denials in cases
where treatments have never been attempted or have shown no likeli-
hood of success.
In applying this standard, courts should consider current evidence
and medical opinion, instead of only that existing when the insured
first sought coverage. To do otherwise ignores the realities of medical
research. It ignores the possibility of rapid technological advancement
and that medical journals publish studies long after the research is
complete.'" Courts should not uphold coverage denials when the
"proof" materializes only after the claim is submitted.
It is also important that courts not consider the following factors
indicative of a treatment's experimental status. First, a treatment's
high cost does not mean that it is experimental; not all expensive treat-
ments are experimental. For example, HDCT-ABMT may cost as
much as $125,000, but it has been proven safe and effective treatment
for some conditions. 47 Allowing insurers to confuse high cost with
truly experimental status introduces a new category of excluded treat-
ment that was not part of the contract the insured signed.
143. See, e-g., Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 138 (D. N.J. 1989).
144. Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 591 (E.D. Va. 1990).
145. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
147. Dozsa 716 F. Supp. at 135.
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Second, a treatment that needs further refinement and research is
not necessarily experimental. Thus, the use of research protocols
should not be considered indicative that a treatment is experimental.
Research protocols may be used to refine knowledge about a treat-
ment's applications after it is accepted as standard treatment.1 48 For
instance, in Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 4 9 expert testimony
indicated that in vitro fertilization was "beyond the purely experimen-
tal, but that like so much of the rest of medicine, improvements would
be made through further experimentation." 150
Third, a physician's treatment recommendation may be persuasive
evidence that it is not experimental, but it should not be dispositive. I"
Physicians may recommend treatments to seriously ill patients when
no other proven approaches are likely to succeed.1 5 2 When physicians
recommend treatments as a last resort, their recommendations should
not be dispositive evidence that the treatments are non-experimental.
2. Courts Should Review Insurer Criteria for Clarity
By construing undefined experimental treatment exclusions nar-
rowly, courts will encourage insurers to include decisionmaking crite-
ria in their contracts. In reviewing such criteria, courts should
consider both the insurers' need for flexibility and the insureds' right
to clarity.
Insurers need experimental treatment exclusions flexible enough to
respond to the inconsistent testing of new technologies.' 53 Flexibility
allows insurers to use a single standard with varying levels of proof of
a treatment's safety and efficacy. Consider, for example, the Blue
Cross-Blue Shield criteria.' The first criterion is unambiguous yet
inflexible: "Is the drug or device approved by the [FDA] to market for
the particular [condition or use] in question?" '55 The third criterion,
however, is less objective but more flexible: "Does the available scien-
tific evidence demonstrate a net beneficial effect on health out-
148. Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 593 (E.D. Va. 1990).
149. 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
150. Id. at 421. But see Sweeney v. Gerber Prods. Co. Medical Benefits Plan, 728 F. Supp.
594 (D. Neb. 1989) (that doctors were experimenting with different drugs in different dosages
indicated the treatment was experimental).
151. Cf. Shumake v. Travelers Ins. Co., 147 Mich. App. 600, 383 N.W.2d 259, 263--64 (1985)
(a doctor's recommendation does not necessarily mean a treatment is necessary, but should be
given deference.)
152. See supra note 37-39 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 46.
155. Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 590 (E.D. Va. 1990).
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comes?" 156  This third criterion is broad ,enough to allow
consideration of more than medical journals, permitting consideration
of a variety of types of scientific evidence. Further, the net beneficial
effect requirement may allow consideration of the impact of the condi-
tion on the patient. For instance, when patients are terminally ill a
new treatment's possible advantages may easily outweigh its risks.
Although experimental treatment exclusions must be flexible, they
should be unambiguous. Courts should consider six factors in review-
ing insurer criteria. First, contracts should clearly express the rela-
tionship between the criteria and the exclusion. In Dozsa, the
insurance contract excluded "experimental" treatments. 57 Using cri-
teria designed to assess whether a treatment was "investigational," the
plan administrator determined that HDCT-ABMT was not cov-
ered.1' s The court held that denying coverage on the basis that
HDCT-ABMT was "investigational" created a new exclusion because
the plan only excluded "experimental" treatment. 159
Second, the decisionmaking criteria should be comprehensive, clear,
and specific, including quantifying standards where possible."6 Thus,
an insurer should indicate whether a certain quantity of data or a par-
ticular survival rate or cure rate is required for coverage. 61 For exam-
ple, in Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield,62 the opportunities to study
the insured's illness were limited because the insured's condition was
rare,1 63 yet the insurer disregarded a group of studies performed in
England and denied coverage.' At trial, the insurer insisted that too
few studies had been performed. When pressed for a number of stud-
ies that would be sufficient, the insurer said "there is no specific
number," but later said "at least 50," which exceeded the number of
cases of the disease worldwide.165 The insurer's criteria were vague
with regard to the amount of evidence required and unresponsive to
the problems posed by rare conditions.
156. Id
157. 716 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D. NJ. 1989).
158. Id at 135-36.
159. Id at 138.
160. But see Cline & Rosten, supra note 8, at 134 (all-inclusive policy language is likely to be
unenforceable as a "sea of print," while "simple, direct" language is likely to leave areas of
reasonable doubt which courts will resolve in the insureds' favor).
161. See Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 589-90 (E.D. Va. 1990).
162. No. 90-597 (D. NJ. Mar. 22, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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Third, insurers should incorporate outside technology reviews when
assessing treatments. This avoids the appearance and possible influ-
ence of insurers' self-interest in the outcome of the assessment pro-
cess. 166 In Jones v. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, the insurer
relied solely on its medical consultant's opinion that hyperthermia
treatment was experimental for treating breast cancer. 16 7 Had the
insurer consulted outside organizations, it would have found that the
AMA considered the treatment an established medical practice and
that Medicare and other insurers covered it.168 Thus, the insurer's
process predetermined the conclusion.
Fourth, insurers should review technologies frequently in specialty
areas where developments occur quickly. The insurer in Pirozzi
denied coverage based on a technology assessment that was more than
a year old.' 6 9 Independent expert testimony noted the "substantial
time lag" between the conclusion of recent promising experimental
studies and publication of their results.170 Thus, a more recent investi-
gation would have provided the insurer a more positive view of the
work being done with HDCT-ABMT. By failing to update its assess-
ment of a rapidly developing treatment, the insurer may have errone-
ously denied coverage.
Fifth, insurers should consult with experts in the specialty area at
issue. For example, in Dozsa, the insurer claimed that the medical
literature contained insufficient data about the treatment to support its
use with the insured's type of cancer, multiple myeloma.17 ' Experts
testified, however, that despite the paucity of medical literature, the
treatment was commonly and customarily recognized by oncolo-
gists.' 72 When an established treatment is used with new conditions,
the most up-to-date and accurate information is likely to come from
experts in the treatment's specialty area.
Finally, insurers' technology assessment criteria should describe all
the factors considered. For instance, if an insurer considers the impact
of the condition on the patient, that should be described in the criteria.
If a treatment is less likely to be deemed experimental when used to
treat someone who will die without it than with someone whose sur-
166. For example, see Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 846 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir.) ("The
fact that Blue Cross ... relied on the advice of its own advisory groups ... creates an inherent
risk of abuse."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
167. 906 F.2d 480, 483 (9th Cir. 1990).
168. Id. at 482.
169. See Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 590 (E.D. Va. 1990).
170. Id. at 592.
171. 716 F. Supp. 131, 138-39 (D. N.J. 1989).
172. Id. at 139.
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vival is not an issue, the criteria should say so. In such a situation,
new fertility treatments would be held to stricter standards of proof
than treatments for terminally ill patients.173
Requiring insurers to enunciate their decisionmaking criteria in
health insurance contracts achieves three important goals. First, it
promotes informed assent. Public policy requires that consumers are
informed about which treatments contracts exclude in order to make
informed purchases. A description of criteria relevant to a treatment's
status allows insurance consumers to better ascertain the level of cov-
erage offered. Second, including decisionmaking criteria in health
insurance contracts minimizes the possibility of insurer manipulation
of experimental treatment exclusions. If insurers articulate the factors
that will inform their decisions, they will be less likely to consider
undisclosed factors such as cost. This approach will likely lead to
more meaningful judicial review. When courts review insurers' deci-
sions, insurer consideration of undisclosed factors is more apparent
when criteria are enunciated in the contract. Finally, this approach
promotes broad coverage, while allowing for reasonable limits on
insurer liability. Such limits are possible because a coverage denial
predicated on a defined exclusion may withstand judicial review. This
approach promotes broad coverage by requiring that insurers consider
only disclosed factors in assessing technology.
III. CONCLUSION
General insurance law and contract principles require that insurers
fully define coverage exclusions, such as those for experimental treat-
ment, in the contract. Courts construe undefined and ambiguous
exclusions against insurers. Under the policy of informed assent,
insurers must fully explain exclusions in insurance contracts. Simi-
larly, insurers should enunciate the criteria they use to assess and
characterize new treatments both because insurers may easily manipu-
late undefined experimental treatment exclusions to inappropriately
deny coverage and because of the inconsistency with which new tech-
nologies are studied and tested.
Courts should consider undefined experimental treatment exclu-
sions ambiguous. In construing such contracts, courts should assess
whether treatments have any demonstrated likelihood of success and
safety. This standard acknowledges that not all new treatments are
studied and that publication of promising studies often is delayed.
173. Cf Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 846 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.s. 856 (1988).
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Moreover, requiring insurers to enunciate their evaluative criteria will
promote informed assent and provide for better insurer decisionmak-
ing and more meaningful judicial review. These requirements will
encourage broad coverage while maintaining insurers' ability to place
reasonable limits on their liability.
Jennifer Belk
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